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1. Introduction 
 
Since the start of reforms in 1978, spectacular economic growth and poverty 
reduction in China have been accompanied by sharp rises in inequality and increasingly 
frequent manifestations of social tension through unrest of various types. In response to 
these rising inequalities, in 2005 the Chinese government has adopted an explicit 
objective of “harmonious development”. A key dimension of harmonious development is 
balanced development across regions. Many strategies and investment plans have been 
developed to stimulate growth and improvement of living standards of residents in rural 
areas and in less developed Western China.  
 
This paper reviews the evolution of regional disparities in China, and brings 
information and trends up to date with the latest data available. It relates the evolution of 
spatial inequality over the years to policy stances taken by the Chinese authorities during 
different phases since 1949. Based on this assessment, it then presents the broad outline 
of a strategy to harmonize growth and regional equity. We consider three elements of this 
strategy, under the heading of three categories of policy instruments: infrastructure, social 
investment and protection, and governance reform. Specific policies within this broad 
strategy are then discussed in light of international experience. It is suggested that 
although the broad strategy for China is by and large not much different to that being 
followed in other countries facing the problems of growing regional disparities, the 
successes and failures of specific policies in other countries have something to share with 
Chinese policy makers. We also propose that the Chinese government take an 
experimental approach to these interventions, as it did in the early period of agricultural 
reforms, by trying out different interventions and learning lessons from their outcomes 
before scaling up. 
 
 
2.  Evolution of Regional Disparities and Policy 
 
2.1  Regional Disparities in China 
 
Regional disparities are a feature of the world, particularly of low and middle 
income countries. As Kanbur and Venables (2007) document, within country disparities 
are high and have been growing in the past quarter century. Here are some examples: 
 
In the European Union, “One region in four has a GDP per inhabitant 
under 75% of the average of the European Union of 27.” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/why/index_en.htm) 
 
 In Peru, the incidence of poverty in districts at sea level is 46.1%, while 
for districts at an altitude greater than 3,500 meters above sea level it was 
63.3% (Escobal and Torero, 2005).  
 
 In Indonesia, the rural poverty incidence is 46.5% in West Kalimantan, but 
only 10.7% in Yogyakarta (Friedman, 2005).  
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 Forster, Jesuit and Smeeding (2005) examine changes in the regional 
patterns of inequality in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia 
using data from the Luxembourg Income Study for the 1990s. They find 
that “capital cities and major urban areas are mainly winners, while 
regions which are longer distances from their rich western neighbors 
characterize losers.”  
 
The examples given above can be repeated dozens of time the world over. China 
is no exception to this global pattern. As shown in Table 1, in 2008, per capita GDP in 
the inland regions averaged 13,513 Yuan, or less than half of that in the coastal regions.2
How have regional disparities in their different dimensions evolved since the 
revolution? Table 2 lists major economic indicators for China from 1952 to 2008. Table 3 
presents inequality measures and Figure 1 graphs the evolution of China’s regional 
inequality, as measured by the Gini and generalized entropy (GE) indices.
 
At the provincial level, the difference is even larger.  Per capita GDP in Shanghai is 10 
times as large as in Guizhou.  If measured by per capita income, rural and urban residents 
in the inland earned only about two-thirds of their counterparts in the east. The rural-
urban gap in per capita income is also enormous: 3 times in the coastal regions and 3.2 
times in the inland regions.   
 
Social indicators follow a similar pattern. The infant mortality rate (IMR) in the 
coast in 2005 was only 9‰, about half the level in the inland (18.8‰). In both coastal 
and inland areas, rural IMR was about twice of the urban IMR. Regarding literacy rate in 
2005, coastal and urban areas also performed much better than inland and rural areas, 
respectively. For all three indicators, the rural-urban gap is wider in inland regions than in 
coastal regions.  
 
3
                                                 
2 The coastal region includes Beijing, Liaoning, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi. All the remaining provinces are classified as inland. 
3 The figures may be slightly different from those presented in Kanbur and Zhang (2005) for two reasons. 
In this paper, we use 1978 as a base year when calculating real per capita consumption instead of 1952 as 
used in the Kanbur and Zhang paper. Second, we include Hainan and Chongqing as separate observations 
after they were upgraded into provincial status.   
 The two 
indices move in close relation to each other, matching the different phases of Chinese 
development remarkably well.  
 
 Over the past fifty years inequality has peaked three times—during the Great 
Famine, at the end of the Cultural Revolution, and in the current period of global 
integration. Similarly, there are three major troughs in the overall evolution of 
inequality—in 1952, right at the beginning of the data series; in 1967, at the end of the 
recovery from the Great Famine and before the effects of the Cultural Revolution set in; 
and in 1984, at the end of the rural reform period and the start of the expansion based on 
global integration. Overall, inequality seems to have been low when policy was 
encouraging to agriculture and the rural sector generally, and high when this sector was 
relatively neglected. 
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These patterns of income inequality can be disaggregated by decomposing overall 
inequality into sub-components and examining the evolution of these components. 
Because each year, we have observations at the provincial level with a rural-urban divide, 
the GE index can be decomposed into a “within rural-urban” and a “between rural-urban” 
component (we will call the latter rural-urban inequality).  The overall GE and the 
between rural-urban component are shown in Table 3 and plotted separately in Figures 1 
and 2.  Another key dimension of inequality in China, especially in the post-reform 
period, is that between inland and coastal provinces (Chen and Fleisher, 1996; and Zhang 
and Kanbur, 2001). The “between inland-coastal” component (we will call it inland-
coastal inequality thereafter) is reported in Table 3 and graphed in Figure 3. It is apparent 
that while rural-urban gap accounts for a large share of overall inequality in the whole 
period, it is inland-coastal disparity which has grown rapidly since the late 1970s when 
China started its economic reform.  
 
For the evolution of inequality in non-income indicators, we mainly look at 
illiteracy rate and infant mortality rate (IMR). Table 4 presents the levels of these two 
indicators in 1981, 1990, 2000 and 2005, when population census and survey data are 
available. Both indicators have improved over this period. Similar to economic 
indicators, the rural-urban and coastal-inland gaps in social indicators are enormous. In 
2005, both illiteracy rate and IMR in rural areas are more than twice of those in cities. 
The IMR in inland regions are as high as 18.8‰, more than twice of the level in coastal 
regions. Table 5 lists regional inequality in these two indicators. Both Gini and Theil 
indexes show that social inequality has increased steadily from 1981 to 2005. Overall, the 
regional pattern of social inequality closely mirrors that of income inequality.  
 
2.1 Policies and Outcomes 
 
 The evolution of regional inequalities in China since the Revolution has been 
influenced by the policy stances taken by the authorities. Table 2 shows the evolution of 
three economic policy variables – the share of heavy industry in gross value of total 
output (a measure of the bias against agriculture and China’s comparative advantage), the 
ratio of trade volume to total GDP and effective tariff rate (a measure of the degree of 
openness), and the ratio of local government expenditure to total government expenditure 
(a measure of fiscal decentralization). These will be discussed further in the next sub-
section. We argue below that there is a close association between these policies and 
regional disparities.4
The enormous rural-urban gap largely originated from China’s heavy industry-led 
development strategies implemented in the planned economic era. In the 1950s, 
influenced by the experience and ideology of the Soviet Union and threatened by trade 
embargos, China placed the development of heavy industry as the top priority. However, 
 
 
                                                 
4 In Kanbur and Zhang (2005), an econometric analysis was conducted to establish the relationship between 
economic policies and observed regional inequality patterns up to 2000. The statistical analysis confirms 
the narrative account given in this section. Because the variables used in calculating the heavy industry 
development strategy is no longer published since 2000, in this paper, we could not update the regression to 
2007.  
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this strategy clearly violated China’s comparative advantage at the time which was 
marked with abundant labor but limited capital resources (Lin et al. 2003). To finance the 
capital-intensive heavy industry sector, the government had to suppress agricultural 
product prices so as to extract as much resources as possible. To ensure a stable labor 
supply in the agricultural sector, the government imposed the household registration 
system (Hukou) to confine people to work in their birth places. Meanwhile, the rationing 
system enabled urban residents to have access to food, housing, education, and 
guaranteed jobs in the state or collectively owned firms. The Hukou system artificially 
created a large rural-urban gap. The heavy industry-led development strategy climaxed at 
the Great Leap Forward, which eventually led to the disastrous Great Famine in 1959-
1961. As attested in Figure 2, the rural-urban gap peaked at the Great Famine period and 
in the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).  
 
In the 1950s after breaking its normal relationship with the former Soviet Union, 
amidst acrimony with both the western world and the former Soviet Union, the 
government targeted public investment toward interior regions, for security reasons, to 
protect against potential invasion from these enemies. To a large extent, the Chinese 
economy was closed to the outside world. In a closed economy, a region’s comparative 
advantage is based on its agricultural production conditions. Coastal regions, in this 
context, did not enjoy as much of a location advantage as the interior regions did. Under 
these conditions, the coastal-inland divide was low and steady, much smaller than the 
rural-urban gap, as demonstrated in Figure 3.  
 
The strategy led to nearly three decades of stagnation in per capita income. By the 
end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Chinese economy was at the brink of an 
abyss. For fear of renewed famine due to the dismal performance of agricultural 
production under the collective farming system, in the late 1970s the central government 
shifted its development strategies toward more labor intensive sectors, initially 
agriculture, and then increasingly export-oriented rural industries. The rural reform 
granted farmers the user right to cultivate their land and make their production decisions. 
The reform greatly stimulated farmers’ production incentives and boosted their income. 
Consequently, both the rural-urban gap and overall inequality witnessed a sharp decline 
in this rural reform period as shown in Figures 1 and 2.  
 
Because of the dramatic increase in labor productivity under the rural reform, a 
surplus labor developed in agriculture. In addition, rising income from rural residents 
drove up the demand for many manufactured goods. This created a good opportunity to 
develop labor-intensive town-village enterprises (TVEs). Because the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) were slow to respond to the emerging market demand, TVEs naturally 
filled in the niches. Not surprisingly, TVEs’ share of gross domestic product (GDP) 
increased from 14.3% in 1980 to 37.5% in 1995 (Xu and Zhang 2009). It is no 
exaggeration that the TVE was the major engine of China’s growth and industrialization 
in the early stages of China’s reforms and helped narrow the rural-urban gap.  
 
Since the 1980s, openness has become a key development strategy. China’s 
central government liberalized significantly upon WTO accession in 2001, with a 40 
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percent statutory tariff in 1992 down to a 7 percent one after WTO accession (Huang and 
Luo 2009). With openness to the outside world, the comparative advantage for coastal 
regions began to reshape. Geographic location replaced agricultural production 
conditions as the key determinant of a region’s comparative advantage. The coastal 
regions benefited disproportionately from this openness due to their proximity to the 
international market and more developed economies, particularly Hong Kong and 
Taiwan. The coastal region also enjoyed a series of favorable government policies, such 
as special economic zones and preferential tax breaks. From 1999 to 2005, the central 
government’s capital investment in the coastal region was 4,696.7 billion Yuan (52.94 
percent) to the central region’s 2,255.1 billion Yuan (25.42 percent) and the western 
region’s 1,920.4 billion Yuan (21.65 percent) (Yao 2009). Coupled with location 
advantages, the increased investment and tax breaks made the coastal regions more 
attractive to both foreign and domestic companies. In less than two decades, China 
became the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries from a virtually closed 
economy in the late 1970s. As a result, the coastal regions experienced much more rapid 
growth, widening the coastal-inland gap in the reform period since the late 1970s (Figure 
3). In terms of trends, coastal-inland inequality showed a steep climb during this period.  
 
After opening to trade, the central government also underwent a significant 
transition from a planned economy to a market economy, which was highlighted by 
several key market reforms. Labor market development in the past several decades has 
been unprecedented. The success of rural reform in the early 1980s released a tremendous 
number of labor from agricultural production. The government has introduced various 
policies to ease labor migration (Cai 2010). First, during the initial stage of the rural 
reform, farmers were allowed to work in nonagricultural sectors even without migration.  
Second, more importantly, the hukou system was greatly loosened enabling workers to 
migrate towards regions with more job opportunities, i.e. the coastal regions. Both policy 
change and structural transformations have generated one of the most dramatic migration 
dynamics in human history. In 1983, the number of rural migrants numbered only two 
million. By 2006, it reached over 132 million (Cai 2010). The young and more educated 
are more likely to work off the farm (Maurier-Fazio 1999 and de Brauw et al. 2002), 
thereby increasing returns to education investment. Migration plays an important role in 
reducing rural poverty in two ways. First, many migrants send remittance back home, 
which have become an important income source for their families (Taylor, Rozelle, and 
de Brauw, 2003). Second, even without remittances, as long as migrants can live by their 
own means outside, the family members remaining home may still benefit because there 
are fewer people to feed and land-labor ratio becomes more favorable (Xing et al. 2009). 
This is so called “denominator” effect. Based on primary survey data in Guizhou 
Province, Xing et al. (2009) estimate that migration reduces poverty incidence by 23% in 
the poor area. 
 
Despite the massive migration, compared to developed countries, the share of 
population working in the agricultural sector is still high. But this suggests opportunities 
for institutional reforms to further improve labor market integration. Zhang and Tan 
(2007) estimate that reallocating even 1 percent of the agricultural labor force could 
increase national GDP by 0.9 percent. So there are still potential large gains from further 
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labor market reform. However, “easy” reform measures may well be more difficult to 
find in the future as migration policies are closely intertwined with the social protection 
policies that we will touch upon in the next section.  
 
Although China experienced a short period of product market segmentation in the 
early stages of economic reform (Young 2000), since the early 1990s China has adopted 
various policy measures to remove the trade barriers to product markets across regions 
(Zhang and Tan 2007). Prices and quantities of inputs and outputs were rigidly controlled 
by the state before the reform.  These controls were gradually relaxed over time.  By the 
mid-1990s, prices and quantities of most of products were regulated by the market.  
Furthermore, the National People’s Congress passed the “Law on Unjust Competition” in 
1993, and in 2001 the State Council issued order 303 “Stipulation of the State Council to 
Forbid Regional Blockade in Market Activities.” In addition, the government has made 
massive investments in highway and railway construction in the past two decades to 
lower transportation costs across regions (Huang and Luo 2009). Both policy reforms and 
infrastructure development were intended to develop the markets across regions. 
Standard economic theory dictates that market development should facilitate the 
convergence of regional economies, as returns to labor and capital equalize across 
regions. Contrary to expectation, however, urban versus rural regional inequality 
remained high, while the inland-coastal disparity has been increasing until 2007, the point 
up to which the latest data are available.  
 
One plausible explanation for the fact that disparities increased in the wake of 
market development is that the capital market may have become more fragmented over 
time. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) and Zhang and Tan (2007) found that the gap in 
the marginal product of capital across sectors and regions grew during the reform period. 
Poncet, Steingress and Vandenbussche (2008) discovered that Chinese firms follow a 
“political-pecking order” in attaining formal credit. The SOEs have easy access to state 
bank loans, while most private firms are credit constrained. Consequently, SOEs have 
lower returns to capital than private and foreign firms (Claro 2005; Dollar and Wei 
2007). The large inefficiency in capital allocation across sectors and regions also implies 
opportunities. According to the estimate of Zhang and Tan (2007), reallocating one 
percent of capital from urban to rural areas while holding total capital constant would 
lead to 0.5% of gain in national GDP. With the more efficient use of capital, China could 
substantially lower its high investment rate, which is unsustainable in the long run. Such 
an improvement in investment efficiency could lead to a faster rise in household 
consumption and living standards. 
 
To provide greater incentives for local governments to develop their local 
economies, the central government has initiated fiscal reform by linking local 
expenditures more tightly to local revenues. Fiscal decentralization greatly enhanced 
inter-county competition and promoted economic growth (Cheung 2008; Qian and 
Roland 1998). However, with China’s hierarchical governance structure, a region’s 
government size is proportional to the number of registered inhabitants regardless of its 
local economic size. The responsibility of financing local public goods services, such as 
education, healthcare and government employee salaries, is the same across regions. 
8 
 
Large regional variation in economic development levels mean that the effective tax 
burden differs greatly across regions, despite the fact that the nominal tax rate is 
supposed to be the same everywhere. In coastal China, as there are already so many firms 
and a larger tax base, the local government has the leeway to loosen its tax collection 
effort. Consequently the effective tax burden for each individual firm is lower. This 
creates a lucrative investment environment, attracting more mobile capital both from 
overseas and from the interior regions (Zhang 2006). In contrast, inland region local 
governments often have to rely heavily on existing enterprises for revenue. The implicit 
high tax burden thwarts potential investment despite the fact that the marginal product of 
capital may be in fact higher there. The interaction between the decentralized fiscal 
system and the centralized governance structure may lead to the observed pattern of 
“capital flying from poor inland to the rich coastal regions” (Zhang 2006).  
 
Overall, fiscal centralization enabled the central government more discretionary 
power for regional redistribution, while decentralization provided more incentives for 
local governments to develop their economy at some cost of redistribution. As indicated 
in Figure 4, the pattern of overall regional inequality largely coincides with the degree of 
decentralization in the past six decades.  
 
Apart from the above three economic policies, the existing institutional 
arrangements on natural resource rent allocation may further contribute to the worsening 
disparities. In China, the majority of natural resources are located in the inland regions. 
As a result of rapid economic growth, mainly in the coastal regions, increased demand for 
natural resources has driven their prices upwards. In theory, the increase in price should 
benefit the interior regions and help reduce the disparity between the resource-rich inland 
regions and the more industrialized coastal regions. Due to the government’s holding of 
property rights over key natural resources, however, most rents from these natural 
resources go toward the government budget and benefit investors at the expense of 
ordinary residents in the inland regions (Zhang et al. 2008). This exacerbates the 
inequality between the inland and coastal regions, rather than providing an opportunity to 
correct the imbalance. 
 
The resource curse (or Dutch disease) is pandemic across many resource-rich 
countries or regions (Sachs and Warner, 2001). However, some successful international 
experiences may be relevant. For example, Norway has been renowned for its efficient 
management of its rich oil resources.5 It set up a petroleum fund to insulate the domestic 
economy from large fluctuations of oil prices and revenues. Another successful story is 
Chile, which put aside a large portion of copper proceeds during its boom years for 
reserves which have been used to buffer the recent financial crisis (Davis, 2007).6
In congruence with the regional inequality in income and consumption presented 
here, social and welfare indicators have exhibited a similar pattern of disparity. Under 
     
 
                                                 
5 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petroleum_Fund_of_Norway.  
6 “Can Copper-Rich Chile Avoid Surplus-Cash Pitfalls?” (Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2007). 
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB117909372050801357-
9CN_zEDzfJJ38kBXQa0viF2VBm8_20070520.html?mod=regionallinks.  
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central planning, the central government promoted universal basic education and called 
for each community to establish its own clinics for preventive healthcare. As a result, 
both education and health indicators improved dramatically in the period. As the 
collectives were dissolved in the late 1970s, so was the rural healthcare system. Under 
fiscal decentralization, however, funding for social programs (along with revenue 
generation) was delegated to the sub-national level. As a result, local governments were 
required to finance their own social programs. The per capita expenditure for subnational 
governments on education and healthcare in the coastal regions has been 1.5 times those 
of the inland regions (Huang and Luo 2009). Many local governments, particularly in the 
inland and rural areas, were forced to charge higher fees for basic and higher education to 
offset the shortfall of local revenues. Although the overall illiteracy and infant mortality 
rates have improved as a result of rapid income growth in the reform period as shown in 
Table 4, the regional distribution of these indicators has worsened as indicated in Table 5.   
 
In large part as a response to the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s, the 
central government initiated a “western development strategy (Go West)” to combat 
worsening inequality. Under this strategy, the government significantly increased its 
investment in infrastructure, particularly in highway and railroads, in western regions. In 
the Go West program, between 2000 and 2005, the central government started 70 main 
construction projects and the total amount of investment in the western regions reached 
one trillion Yuan (Yao 2009). More than one third of the funds raised by long-term 
government bonds for construction were directed to the western regions during this time 
period, and from 2002 to 2005 the percent of funds from these bonds directed to the 
region reached 40 percent (Yao 2009). From 2000-2005, new roads built in the western 
region reached 220,000 km, with 6,853 km of highways (Yao 2009). By 2005, the central 
government invested 460 billion Yuan in construction projects in the western areas. 
Fiscal transfers and subsidies of 500 billion Yuan were also invested in the western areas 
(Chen and Lu 2009).  
 
Moreover, since January of 2006, the government has fully abolished agricultural 
taxation, for the first time in over two thousand years of Chinese history. The government 
also provided subsidies to grain producers to boost agricultural production and farmer 
income. Furthermore, the government has gradually waived various fees for basic 
education in rural areas and in the past several years, a new rural collective medical scheme 
has been introduced. In theory, these changes should help reduce regional inequality, 
through improvements in the western regions. Khan and Riskin (2005) are one of the first 
to argue that  income inequality had begun to level off using a large scale household survey 
in 2002 and identified the western development strategy as the key explanation. It is 
interesting to note that regional inequality and the rural-urban gap based on aggregate per 
capita consumption at the provincial level in our calculation has also  nosed down since 
2005 (Table 3 and Figure 1). Based on primary survey data in two poorest provinces, 
Guizhou and Gansu, Zhang, Yang and Wang (2009) show that real wage has risen rapidly 
since 2003 in contrast to the stagnation of wage level in the early period of 1995-2002, 
indicating an improvement in rural income.  Moreover, there is an increasing number of 
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media report on labor shortage in the coastal areas.7
“To reduce economic and social disparities: One region in four has a GDP 
per inhabitant under 75% of the average of the European Union of 27…. 
To show solidarity and remain competitive: European regional policy is 
designed to bring about concrete results, furthering economic and social 
cohesion to reduce the gap between the development levels of the various 
regions.” (
 As the labor market develops in favor 
of migrant workers, it is likely that the rural-urban income gap narrows. However, it 
requires more rigorous analyses based on updated and comprehensive data to judge 
whether the shrinking rural-urban gap since 2005 is a permanent trend or just a transient 
phenomenon.     
 
The recent economic crisis has created an opportunity for China to shift its focus 
towards the less developed rural and inland regions, complementing the western 
development strategy already in place. In the past three decades, China has relied heavily 
on exports to the international market for its economic growth. The recent financial crisis 
poses a significant threat to this export-oriented growth model. With shrinking external 
demand, the Chinese government has put forward a massive stimulus package targeted 
toward the rural and interior regions, in an attempt to boost domestic and rural demand. 
Consequently, the policy discourse in China on regional inequality and on inequality 
generally, is very different now than even a decade ago. Not surprisingly, in the first two 
quarters of 2009 the inland regions have enjoyed faster GDP growth than coastal regions. 
This implies that the stimulus package has been at least initially successful in promoting 
growth in the inland regions. The continued economic crisis serves a good opportunity 
for the government to increase public investment in the rural and inland regions, establish 
a rural social safety net, and eventually narrow the regional gap in development.  
 
 
3.  Policies to Address Regional Disparities 
 
3.1  A Framework for Regional Policy in Light of Global Experience 
 
 As we have seen, China’s regional disparities are high, and have been growing. 
This pattern is seen throughout the world, and especially in low and middle income 
countries. Not surprisingly, many if not most countries have regional policies to address 
these disparities. In the European Union, regional policy takes on a transnational 
character, with particular focus on lagging countries, and lagging regions within lagging 
countries. 
 
 The broad considerations that underlie regional policy have commonalities across 
the world. Here is how the European Union formulates the objectives: 
 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/why/index_en.htm) 
                                                 
7 For example, "How Rising Wages Are Changing The Game In China" (Business Week, 2006). See 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_13/b3977049.htm; “Sharp Labor Shortage in China 
May Lead to World Trade Shift” (New York Times, 2006), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A02E5DB1330F930A35757C0A9609C8B63.  
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 To take another example, this is how Beaumier (1998) describes the origins of 
Canadian regional policy: 
“Almost from the beginning of Confederation, the federal government has 
implemented programs that affected some regions more profoundly than 
others. Such programs were never part of a federal regional development 
policy, however, until the 1960s, when federal politicians became aware 
of differences in the levels of regional prosperity and accepted the 
responsibility for eliminating them. The Rowell-Sirois and Gordon Royal 
Commissions and the advent of a serious recession in the late 1950s 
focused attention on the persistent regional disparities. Until that time, 
authorities had believed that government policies aimed at stimulating 
national economic growth would ensure that all regions benefited. While 
this was true during periods of growth, the disparities did not disappear 
and improvements were achieved only at the cost of severe social 
dislocations.” (http://dsp-psd.tpsgc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/CIR/8813-
e.htm).  
The above concerns apply almost universally, and we have already alluded to how 
the Chinese authorities have in recent years become increasingly concerned about 
growing regional disparities. There is also a significant commonality in the debate 
internationally on how the objective of reducing regional disparities is to be achieved. A 
popular way of phrasing the debate is: “should we move people to the jobs, or move jobs 
to the people?” The answer to this question depends not only on the technical features 
and cost-benefit calculations of the different policy instruments debated, but also on the 
precise nature of the objective of reducing regional economic and social disparities. Put it 
simply, how far is it politically feasible to go in moving people out of a region and into 
another? In the extreme, is it feasible to implement policies that would completely 
depopulate a region which has its own regional, cultural and political identity? In 
federated polities, and in trans-national unions such as the European Union, even as there 
are strong sentiments to remove impediments to migration so that people can move to the 
jobs, there is nevertheless an imperative to preserve regions as viable entities, and hence 
to move jobs to the people. 
For these reasons, government policies and expenditures to encourage 
development in lagging regions are universal, and they cover the gamut from 
infrastructure to social investment and protection, as well as a range of interventions that 
cover regional governance in relation to central government. The European Union, for 
example, has a Cohesion Fund: 
“The Cohesion Fund is aimed at Member States whose Gross National 
Income (GNI) per inhabitant is less than 90% of the Community average. 
It serves to reduce their economic and social shortfall, as well as to 
stabilise their economy….For the 2007-2013 period the Cohesion Fund 
concerns Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia 
12 
 
and Slovenia. The Cohesion Fund finances activities under the following 
categories: 
• trans-European transport networks, notably priority projects of European 
interest as identified by the Union;  
• environment; here, Cohesion Fund can also support projects related to energy 
or transport, as long as they clearly present a benefit to the environment: 
energy efficiency, use of renewable energy, developing rail transport, 
supporting intermodality, strengthening public transport, etc.” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/cf/index_en.htm) 
Most countries with regional policies have funds of this type, targeted to different 
instruments but all with the objective of raising economic activity and well being in 
lagging regions. For the case of Brazil, its National Policy for Regional Development 
(NPRD) encompasses the motivations, objectives and instruments discussed so far: 
“In Brazil, the regional inequalities pose a serious hindrance to the 
Nation’s development process. The State in the Federation boasting the 
highest per capita GDP, for example, outsizes nine times the state with the 
lowest indicator….The Ministry for National Integration works under the 
assumption that the path toward reducing inequalities must accommodate 
the country’s extraordinary regional diversity. ….[T]he new National 
Regional Development Policy – NPRD…was formulated as a government 
policy, under the Ministry for National Integration, and is linked to the 
initiatives of establishment of the new Regional Development Agencies 
(Sudam, Sudene and Sudeco), the reorientation of the Constitutional 
Funds (FNO, FNE and FCO) and the Regional Development Funds (FDA 
and FDNE), the regional development plans and programs and other 
instruments and mechanisms for their implementation.” 
(http://www.integracao.gov.br/desenvolvimentoregional/pndr/english/sum
ario.asp#summary) 
In large thanks to the cash transfer program “Bolsa Familia,” inequality in Brazil 
has dropped steadily since 1993. Coupling with improved equality, Brazil has achieved 
an impressive record in cutting poverty − its rate of poverty reduction per unit of growth 
is more than five times of China or India did (Ravallion, 2009). The above provides a 
background for what exactly it is that the Chinese authorities can learn from international 
experience in regional policy. We believe that in general terms the international 
understanding of the problem, and the broad instruments used to address the problem, are 
similar to each other, and in a sense similar to the understanding of Chinese authorities, 
and to the broad instruments that Chinese authorities are beginning to deploy. The 
lessons, if any, must come from the specificities of the instruments, but here a key feature 
is that the specific context of countries differs, and great care must be taken to transfer 
the lessons of international experience—in many ways the lessons of China’s own 
experiences are more relevant, and China should create more lessons by experimenting 
with policies and interventions before scaling up. 
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In what follows we will illustrate these arguments for three categories of regional 
policy instruments with varying possibilities of learning from international or from 
Chinese experience. For infrastructure investments, China has its own experience to learn 
from, and we discuss these in formulating our policy recommendations. For social 
investment and particularly for social protection China does not have as much 
experience, and there is indeed international experience from which some lessons can be 
drawn, together with Chinese experiments. Finally, for governance reform as a regional 
policy, although there is international experience, the issue of local governance is so 
context and culture specific that we would hesitate to draw lessons from international 
experience. Rather, we feel that China should conduct its own experiments and learn 
from these, in the same way that it learnt from experimentation in the early stages of 
economic reform, including rural and price reforms. The next three sub-sections take up 
these categories of policies in sequence. 
3.2  Infrastructure Investment and Clustering 
 
The multicountry studies discussed in Kanbur and Venables (2007) emphasize the 
importance of public infrastructure as a determinant of regional disparity, over and above 
any natural advantages of resources or location that a region may have. For example: 
 
For Peru, Escobal and Torero (2005) conduct a statistical analysis in 
which explanatory variables are introduced in sequence to explain regional 
income variations in Peru. “First nature” geographic variables such as 
altitude, soil type and temperature are introduced and provide good 
statistical explanation. But when infrastructure variables are introduced 
the explanatory power of the geographic variables weakens and almost 
disappears. 
 
For India, Lall and Chakravorty (2005) show the propensity of private 
sector firms to locate away from “lagging and inland regions”, which are 
of course the regions with poor infrastructure and poor connections to the 
coast and the major urban clusters.  
 
Recent studies on China have shown that investment in public infrastructure can 
be both an explanation for regional inequality and, therefore, part of a strategy for 
containing rising regional inequality. One example of such a study is the work of 
Ravallion (2005). Using appropriate statistical techniques, he establishes that there are 
indeed spatial agglomeration forces at play in explaining changes in individual level 
incomes, and the crucial role of local infrastructure (as well as local natural endowments) 
in explaining successful income growth.  
 
Using the agricultural census data in 1998, Fan and Zhang (2004) show that rural 
infrastructure and education play an important role in explaining the large spatial 
difference in rural nonfarm productivity. Lower productivity in the Western region is 
explained by its lower level of rural infrastructure and education. Using detailed road data 
by type, Fan and Chan-Kang (2008) further confirm that rural road investment even have 
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higher returns than highway investment. Since the rural nonfarm economy is a major 
determinant of rural income, investing more in rural infrastructure in lagging region is 
key to increasing the overall income of the rural population and reducing regional 
inequality. Using a provincial level data set for the period 1978-1995 in rural China, 
Zhang and Fan (2004) quantify that regional variations in the impact of public 
investments on regional inequality are large. Increasing public investment in the less 
developed western region, in particular in rural road and education, will lead to a decline 
in regional disparity. In contrast, if the government continues to favor the coastal region 
in its investment strategy, regional disparities will widen further.  
 
Fan, Zhang, and Zhang (2004) develop a comprehensive analysis of the role of 
different types of government expenditure on rural growth and poverty. Using a wide 
range of provincial data over a period of a quarter century, it builds and estimates a 
simultaneous equations econometric model to calculate economic returns, poverty 
reduction, and impact on regional inequality of different categories of public expenditure. 
It is shown that productivity is enhanced and poverty is reduced by increased 
expenditures for research and development, irrigation, education, roads, electricity and 
telecommunications. Moreover, while for the first decade of reforms, the reforms 
themselves were more important for growth and poverty reduction, since the mid 1980s 
onwards public investment is shown to be the dominant factor explaining both growth 
and reductions in poverty. What is equally interesting, however, is that different 
categories of investments have different payoffs, which in turn differ across regions. 
Education has the biggest payoff for poverty reduction and growth in rural areas. The 
impact of rural telecommunications, electricity and roads was also substantial, working 
through nonfarm employment and rural wages. Thus road investment, for example, had 
the second largest return to growth in the nonfarm economy and in the rural economy 
overall. The policy implications of this analysis are direct and strong. If the government 
wishes to manage growing regional inequality in China, then investing in public 
infrastructure in the lagging regions will have to be an important policy priority. 
 
In the past several years under the western development strategy and the new 
socialism countryside movement, the government has made significant strides in 
investing in infrastructure, particularly through improvements of roads and railways in 
lagging regions. As shown in Figure 1, overall regional inequality has leveled off and 
even slightly declined since the mid 2000s, a few years after the western development 
strategy took place. This provides some tentative evidence that the western development 
strategy may have played a role. Certainly, more rigorous studies are needed to quantify 
the attribution of different policies in reversing the worsening trend of regional inequality 
in the future. Amid the current global financial crisis, the Chinese government has 
initiated a four trillion stimulus package which places improving infrastructure in lagging 
region as a high priority.  
 
 The dramatic increase in infrastructure investment is likely to reshape the 
economic geography. After rapid economic growth in the past three decades, land for 
industrial use has become an increasingly limiting factor in many parts of the coastal 
areas. The demand for labor is also overtaking supply, creating a labor shortage in the 
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past several years (The Economist 2008; Zhang et al. 2009). There is an increasing 
pressure for firms to outsource production or relocate their business to the inland regions 
to access more abundant land and cheaper labor. The trend of firm relocation could create 
a good opportunity for the inland regions. The improvement in road networks enables 
many previously inaccessible interior regions to receive outsourcing orders from coastal 
production centers.  
 
Although inland regions have the advantage of land and labor, they often lack the 
necessary linkages with suppliers and markets, which are key for industrial production. 
The rapid industrialization of the coastal regions is largely due to a successful cluster-
based production model. Within a cluster, firms have easy access to both downstream and 
upstream firms, markets and technologies. The proximity to suppliers and markets greatly 
reduces a firm’s transaction cost. In addition, by dividing the production process into 
incremental steps, the capital barriers to entry are greatly lowered, enabling more 
entrepreneurs to engage in industrial production (Ruan and Zhang 2009).  
 
A basic feature of cluster-based rural industrialization in the coastal region is the 
deep involvement of local governments, particularly township governments. At the initial 
stage when private ownership was officially recognized by the Chinese constitution, local 
governments provided de facto protection of private property rights (Xu and Zhang 
2009). Later on, township governments took strategic responsibilities for the overall 
development of industrial clusters. For example, because production is dispersed among 
many individual producers within a cluster, quality control often becomes a problem. In 
many successful clusters, local governments play a key role in regulating the quality of 
all products within the cluster and overcoming the inherent coordination problem. 
Without the substantial role of the local government, the production cluster would not 
have evolved the scale, efficiency, and high quality of this virtual conglomerate either. 
 
Therefore, it is also important to nurture cluster development in lagging regions. 
Some of the successful clustering experiences in the coastal region may be relevant to the 
interior regions. For example, in 2003 Aokang Group, one of the largest private 
shoemakers in China, set up a 2,600 acres of industrial park “Western Shoe Capital” in 
Chongqing to capitalize the new market opportunities (see http://www.xbxy.cn/index.htm). 
Initially, it brought retired experienced government officials from its hometown in 
Wenzhou of Zhejiang Province to manage the industrial park in Chongqing. It also 
convinced more than 40 shoe manufacturing and accessory enterprises and over 400 shoes 
materials dealers to settle in the park so as to create a new cluster of footwear production.  
 
It is expected that a shift in development strategy from export-oriented to 
domestic-oriented will generate more demand in lagging regions. It is likely more firms 
will relocate their production to interior regions to close to the emerging market. The 
improvement in infrastructure between coastal and inland regions and within interior 
regions will facilitate this transition. The experience of clustering development widely 
seen in the coastal region is largely transferable when the lagging regions try to attract 
more private investment.   
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Thus, in broad strategic terms China’s strategy on infrastructure build up in the 
lagging regions is not very different to that in other countries. Chinese authorities have 
responded to the growing regional gaps by increasing infrastructure investment in the 
lagging regions. There is sufficient experience in China to learn from on this front. 
Research shows that the returns to infrastructure investment in lagging regions are in 
general high. However, there are two specific issues on which more detailed research is 
needed: (i) Further analysis on what specific types of infrastructure have the highest 
returns in which specific regions. (ii) The problem of very remote regions. In these 
regions, the marginal returns to infrastructure investment may decrease quickly as it can 
become extremely costly to build roads and other types of infrastructure --for these 
regions, a more feasible option may be to move people out of the fragile land into areas 
with more jobs. 
 
3.3  Social Protection Investment 
 
Despite spectacular poverty reduction, perhaps the most impressive record of 
poverty reduction in history, poverty remains a major problem in China, with several 
hundred million people in poverty—the exact numbers depending on the precise methods 
and poverty lines of measurement. Addressing poverty, and the vulnerability of the poor, 
thus remains a major policy challenge. Social protection investment is thus key areas of 
debate in China. In this section we will address these concerns through the lens of 
regional disparity—arguing that such programs are particularly important in the lagging 
regions of rural areas and inland provinces. 
 
Our analysis of the evolution of Chinese regional inequality has shown the 
importance of migration in mitigating these inequalities—in periods where migration was 
suppressed (and investment in lagging regions was low), regional inequality rose. 
Chinese authorities should systematically address impediments to migration, but 
sometimes social protection instruments can unwittingly become such impediments. For 
example, in the past several years, the government also has mandated workers to 
participate in social security. Despite the progress, some hurdles remain. One key 
challenge is that the social security benefit is not portable across provinces. Many 
employers provide a matching fund if a worker makes a contribution to their own social 
security account. However, if the worker returns to his hometown in another province, he 
will lose his portion saved. Connecting the social security systems across provinces and 
making the benefit portable would greatly facilitate migration, and remains an important 
plan in a regionally oriented social protection strategy.  
 
Compared to the phenomenal growth in physical infrastructure investment, 
China’s social protection investment record is less impressive since the reform. After 
several decades of negligence of social protection investment in lagging regions, China 
has made tremendous progress in reversing the trend in the past several years. First 
experimented with in the middle of the 1990s, the minimum support program was 
formally scaled up nationwide in 2007. By 2008, 42.8 million rural residents have been 
covered by the program (See Table 6). However, the average amount per capita is still 
rather low at 218 Yuan, about 28% of the official extreme poverty line (778 Yuan). 
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Considering China’s poverty line is lower than the one-dollar-per day poverty line 
commonly used in other countries (which equals to about 1,300 Yuan), there is still 
plenty of room to expand the coverage and augment the amount of the minimum support 
program.   
 
 Another major achievement is the establishment of the new rural collective 
medical service network (CMS). The aim is to ensure that rural residents have easy 
access to primary health care services. In 2003, China began to experiment with the new 
rural collective medical service network. Within just five years, 815 million rural 
residents, 91.5% of the total rural population, have enrolled in the network by 2008. The 
contribution is shared by various levels of government (80%) and individuals (20%). It 
has doubled from 50 Yuan in 2006 to 100 Yuan in 2008. The government has committed 
to significantly increase its contribution in the next few years. Since catastrophic illness is 
one of the most important forces driving a household into poverty, the effort of 
establishing a basic health insurance is greatly lauded. Certainly, the current contribution 
and coverage are much lower than actual medial cost incurred. The reimbursement rate is 
extremely low, only at 30% in many cases.   It is extremely difficult to establish a well 
functioning healthcare insurance system as witnessed by the current healthcare reform in 
the US. Amore pragmatic approach is needed, focusing on the most deprived areas to 
begin with. 
 
One key dimension of social investment is rural education. Rural education in 
China faces serious challenges. Among the most critical is that the current education 
system does not address the needs of vast number of children of migrant workers. The 
cost for migrants’ children to attend local public schools is prohibitive. Although some 
migrant schools have been licensed and officially recognized in recent years, migrant 
students still cannot take college entrance exams in the province of their parents’ working 
place (Yao 2009). As a result, a majority of migrants leave their children behind with 
grandparents. Under this arrangement, local governments in lagging regions bear a large 
share of burden to educate the children of migrant workers while their parents work and 
pay taxes in developed regions.   
 
Because of more limited fiscal revenue, local governments in lagging regions 
generally invest less on education on a per student basis compared to their coastal 
counterparts. In many remote rural villages and townships the cost of education is still 
too high for poor families to afford, even though tuition has been waived for basic nine-
year education in the past several years. In remote areas, schools are often located quite 
far from children’s homes. As a result, children from the poorer regions often have to 
stay in boarding schools. Meeting the cost of meals and boarding remains a great 
challenge for many poor families. The high boarding cost has been ranked as a key 
reason for secondary school students’ dropping out. To combat the high cost of boarding 
schools, a conditional cash transfer program in poorer regions, similar to the Progresa-
Oportunidades program in Mexico, or a school feeding program similar to the “Food For 
Education” (FFE) program in Bangladesh, could simultaneously help alleviate the 
farmers’ burden and improve children’s nutritional status and educational attainment. 
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The Progresa-Oportunidades program is an example of a category of programs 
known as Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs, which entail direct cash transfers 
to poor families, typically associated with parents’ commitment to participating in 
various social service programs, including enrolling their children in schools. This 
program is one of the most well-documented examples of CCT. Research shows that 
participating students of both genders experience improved enrollment and decreased 
incidence of dropouts (Adato and Hoddinott 2007; Behrman et al. 2005; de Janvry and 
Sadoulet 2006; Schultz 2004). 
 
One of the main criticisms of CCT programs is that they often have high 
administrative costs. In the case of Progresa, in its first year of operation it required an 
investment of $1.34 per dollar transferred to participants. Part of this investment, 
however, was focused on one-time costs, such as improving education technology 
(buying computers) and identifying families (Adato and Hoddinott 2007). By the third 
year, Progresa had decreased administrative costs to 5 cents per dollar transferred (Adato 
and Hoddinott 2007). This implies that CCT programs are capable of reducing 
administrative costs to a manageable level. Some types of CCT program may be modified 
and applied in rural China to help reduce the dropout rate of primary and secondary 
school. For example, the popular minimum support program may be tied with the 
condition that children must attend the nine-year basic education.  
 
A second type of program for improving attendance in rural schools is school 
feeding programs. These programs provide a meal for students, either through breakfast 
or lunch at the school, or through take-home rations. One well-documented school 
feeding program is FFE program which was initiated in Bangladesh in 1993. In this 
program, the Government of Bangladesh provides a monthly ration to poor Bangladeshi 
families whose children attend primary school. Ahmed and del Ninno (2002) found that 
for an average transfer of 70 kg of grain over five months, the probability of a child’s 
going to school increased by 7.9 percent. For the first year, 1993-1994, the investment in 
the FFE program was 683.18 million taka ($US16.97 million), reaching 549,881 families. 
In 2000, the final year of the government’s control of the program, the cost had increased 
to 3.94 billion taka ($US77 million) and the number of families benefiting to 2,020,660. 
In its final year, the program costs equate to 5.2 taka ($US0.10) per student, per day 
(Ahmed and del Ninno 2002). China may consider experimenting school feeding 
program in boarding schools in remote rural areas.8
Apart from the burden of education cost, another major challenge for rural 
education is teacher absence. Teacher salaries are currently paid by county governments 
  
 
For many rural students graduating from secondary schools, the decision not to 
pursue high school comes from the slim chance of being admitted to college and the 
related prohibitive cost. The government may also consider waiving the tuition fees for 
high school students in rural areas and providing more scholarships for children from 
poorer backgrounds.  
 
                                                 
8 In many urban areas, over nutrition and child obesity have become a more serious problem. Therefore, it 
is better to target the program only towards remote rural areas.  
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and therefore not subject to the accountability of local residents. Teachers therefore have 
limited financial incentive to perform their duties, leaving rural schools without effective 
educators. One way to combat the lack of dedicated teachers could be to initiate a 
government-program similar to the “Teach For America” program in the US.9
                                                 
9 In this program, college graduates are recruited to serve two year commitments as teachers in some of the 
least developed schools in the US.  
 Given the 
recent dramatic surge of college graduates in China who were unable to find 
employment, this could prove an excellent opportunity to both employ these graduates 
and provide high quality educators to less-developed regions. An important facet of this 
program would be tying student performance to the teachers’ salaries, further 
incentivizing effective teaching techniques. The international experience in aligning 
incentives with teachers’ performance may be also helpful for China (Michael Kremer et 
al. 2005;Chaudhury et al. 2006). 
 
Investing in rural education may have high pay offs in not only narrowing rural-
urban income gap but also sustaining China’s long-term economic growth. The massive 
migration in the past three decades in China benefited from the large pool of educated 
rural labor force which in turn was a result of the universal basic education policy 
implemented in the planning economic era. Given the emerging signs of labor shortage, 
China will likely move from labor-intensive to skill-intensive economy in the next 
several decades. So is the rising demand for more educated workers down the road. 
Therefore, it is critically important to ensure that rural kids in poor areas receive adequate 
education so that they can find a better-paid skilled job in the future, most likely in the 
more developed regions. As the young generation moves out from marginal areas, the 
rural-urban and regional income gap will narrow down.  
 
3.4.  Governance Reform 
 
Large regional disparities may require, and may also hold out opportunities for, 
governance reform. Because China’s unique governance structure and intricate 
institutional texture, measures related to governance reform can be more heterodox and 
context specific. Therefore, the lessons learned in other countries are less transferable to 
China than infrastructure development and social programs. More local trial and error 
and experimentation are needed in carrying out governance reform.  
 
As discussed in the last section, fiscal decentralization plays a strong role in 
promoting inter-county and inter-province competition, which has been argued to be a 
key engine behind China’s rapid economic growth. However, fiscal decentralization has 
had severe distributional consequence as a result of inherent imbalance between the 
decentralized fiscal system and centralized governance structure. Local government size 
and structure are not tailored to reflect the revenue and population base they represent. 
This inflexibility in structure means that when capital and labor flow from the inland 
regions to the coastal regions, the remaining inland governments are forced to raise tax 
rates simply to cover the costs of running the government due to shrinking revenue base. 
This can set in motion a downward spiral. 
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The conventional approaches to resolve this problem are to cut government size in 
the lagging regions and increase central fiscal transfers to these regions. For example, the 
World Bank (2002) has proposed to cut the prefectural level government. In fact, 
Zhejiang Province has put all the counties under direct administration of the provincial 
government from the very beginning of fiscal reform. As the most dynamic region in 
China, Zhejiang’s experience provides a demonstration effect for other province. In the 
past several years, Hubei Province has followed similar reforms. Under direct 
administration, the county government has more discretionary power and fewer levels of 
government to deal with. Moreover, any governance innovations at the county level are 
more likely to spillover to other counties in the same province instead of limiting only at 
the prefecture level. Recently after agricultural taxation was abolished, the central 
government has used the opportunity to freeze hiring in local governments and promoting 
early retirement to cut local government size in the poor rural areas. These strategies of 
first cutting budget and then reducing government size are rather standard practice in 
many countries.   
 
Since the implementation of western development strategy, the central 
government has increased its fiscal transfers to the inland and rural regions. However, 
large transfers may also create aid dependency. For example, the counties with nationally 
designated poverty status enjoy much more transfers. As a result, they do not have strong 
incentive to improve local investment environment to attract more private investment as 
other counties. Instead they turn their attention to seek more transfers from the upper 
level government (Zhang, 2006).  
 
Apart from the above traditional policies, China has also tried many more 
heterodox policy measures. For example, the latest innovations in land development 
rights transfers in the coastal provinces and the use of police officers from the same 
regions as local migrants to fight crime in the coastal provinces show the feasibility of 
overcoming the rigidity of governance structure through social entitlement exchanges 
(Luo and Zhang 2009).10
                                                 
10 The conversion of land from agricultural to non-agricultural use is regulated by the central government 
through a permit system. Because of large regional difference in economic development, the shadow price 
of land for nonfarm use varies greatly across regions. This creates a space for exchanging permit --- the 
more developed regions purchase the land use permit from the less development regions. These exchanges 
have occurred in China, in particular within provinces in the coastal region. For example, in 2002, the 
capital city of Zhejiang Province, Hangzhou, purchased the development rights of 3,000 mu of lands, at a 
price of 60,000 RMB Yuan per mu, from Haining City, a less developed region in Zhejiang Province.  
 Another example is the pair-wise province-to-county aid 
strategy created by the central government after the Sichuan earthquake in 2008. Each 
county in the earthquake region is paired with an unaffected province, usually in the more 
developed coastal region. The province took full responsibility for the recovery and 
reconstruction in the designated county. One high level official from each province was 
sent to their respective disaster county to help coordinate the aid effort. This institutional 
innovation introduced yardstick competition into the process of disaster relief and 
recovery. The province government in the coastal region was evaluated based on their 
performance in terms of recovery and reconstruction in their assigned corresponding 
county.  It is possible that the government could apply this pair-wise development 
strategy to helping inland regions meet the same growth potential as the coastal regions. 
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China’s governance has been largely merit based (Li and Zhou 2005). An 
official’s promotion and demotion is largely linked to his/her political and economic 
performance compared to peers. In the planning economy era, the evaluation of cadres 
was based primarily on political performance. Since the economic reform started in the 
late 1970s, political conformity has been replaced by yardstick competition in key 
economic indicators and central mandates, such as GDP growth rate, fiscal revenue 
growth rates, and family planning (Li and Zhou 2005). Since these indicators have been 
written into local leaders’ contracts, the contents of the contract influence the behavior of 
local offices. Under a growth-oriented incentive structure, local governments favor 
investment in growth-enhancing projects over social programs. The impact of physical 
infrastructure can be easily observed right after it is built while it takes a much longer 
time, often beyond the four-year term of a county director or province governor, to 
witness the lasting impact of social investment. Thereby, local officials, in particular 
those in lagging regions which face more stringent budget, do not have strong incentives 
to implement social programs mandated by the central government.  
 
The central government has adopted a reform to improve the evaluation indicators 
for local officials. In some areas, the social indicators have been included in cadres’ 
contracts in a bid to encourage them to care more about social development. However, 
simply including more social indicators may not work because of challenges in 
monitoring and evaluating social indicators. Recently, some regions have tried to reward 
a county governor to stay in his post for more than two terms at a higher pay scale. The 
purpose of longer tenure is to align local cadres’ incentives with a more balanced long-
term development goal.  In the meantime, some intermediate outcome or process 
variables can also be introduced, for example, citizen report cards, spending on education 
and health, enrollment rates, etc. to evaluate the annual performance of government 
officials. 
 
Reforming the arrangement of natural resource property rights is another option to 
reducing the coastal-inland gap. The inland regions contain a high quantity of natural 
resources. As resource price goes up, the inland region should benefit accordingly. 
Currently, however, the central government and investors retains most of the rents from 
these natural resource endowments, leaving the inland regions with fewer resources 
without adequate compensation to ordinary residents. If the Chinese central government 
was to institute property rights over these natural resources, enabling the inland regions to 
capitalize on rents from them, this would enable the inland regions to develop and would 
diminish the gap between the inland and coastal regions. 
 
Overall, institutional reform and innovation is identified as a key policy response 
to regional inequality. However, the particular reform measures can be heterodox and 
context specific. Some experiments are already under way. We have suggested some 
more in this section. Such an experimental approach, and learning the lessons of Chinese 
experience, appears to us a more fruitful route in this area than looking to other countries; 
experiences with governance. 
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4.  Conclusion: Strategies, Experience and Experiments 
 
China’s rapid economic growth in the past three decades has been much discussed 
and celebrated. But this has not stopped the concern on the growing regional inequality. 
Rising inequality may lead to tensions within a country and comprise the prospect of 
long-term sustainable growth through a variety of social, political and economic 
mechanism (Kanbur and Lustig 2000).  
 
This study tries to unfold the driving forces behind the change in regional 
inequality over the past six decades. The evolution of inequality coincides with different 
phases of China’s economic development strategies. In particular, the heavy industry-led 
development strategy played a key role in forming the enormous rural-urban gap in the 
planned economic era while openness and decentralization have contributed to the rapid 
increase in inland-coastal disparity in the recent period.   
 
The global financial crisis dried out the demand for China’s exports and resulted 
in millions of workers losing their jobs. However, as recent Chinese history attests, crises 
often beget reforms. The crisis provides a unique opportunity for the government to 
rebalance its growth strategies, which it has already begun to do. Previously, the central 
government has failed to put more investment to the rural and inland regions under its 
export-oriented and urban-biased development strategy. But the recent stimulus package 
is largely geared towards improving the inland economy by building long over-due 
infrastructure and set up a basic social safety net in the previously neglected rural and 
inland regions. Looking forward, the current crisis may prove to be a turning point in 
rebalancing China’s regional disparities.  
 
It is important to emphasize that, like many features of China today, regional 
disparities pose both challenges as well as opportunities. Just like for the successful rural 
reforms of the early 1980s, inappropriate policies of the past create challenges, but also 
enormous opportunities for enormous efficiency gains and growth. We have illustrated 
this general point with a number of policy instruments. We want to stress that continuing 
factor market reforms is needed. The gains from further factor market reform may be 
enormous. Despite massive labor migration in the past several decades, there are still a 
large number of people residing in rural areas. Policies that facilitate the relocation of 
labor from low-productive sectors and regions to higher-productive counterparts would 
have a large payoff. The allocation inefficiency in capital markets also implies 
opportunity for further reform. A shift of capital investment from SOEs and cities to 
private firms and rural areas would help balance China’s investment-driven growth 
model and boost citizens’ living standard.  Strengthening financing mechanism for 
private investment in inland China also offers high pay off to overall economic growth 
and reducing regional inequality. 
 
Apart from factor market reform, we have considered three categories of 
instruments: infrastructure, social protection and investment, and governance. On 
infrastructure, China has indeed been engaged in significant activity over the past three 
decades and especially in recent years. We would argue that the lessons to be learnt are 
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from Chinese experience itself. Investment in infrastructure to link coastal and interior 
regions and within lagging regions has a high payoff in promoting economic growth in 
lagging regions and reducing regional gap. However, lessons are to be learned from 
Chinese experience on which types of infrastructure have the highest rates of return in 
which specific regions. Moreover, one has to be aware of diminish marginal returns in 
some areas. In these very remote areas, a more viable option is to increase human capital 
and enable the younger generation to migrate out eventually.  
 
The second category of instruments we consider fall broadly under the heading of 
social protection investment. There is a lively debate on these issues in China, but a 
perspective of regional inequality shed new light on it. For example, the regional 
perspective highlights the importance of portability of social security, to ease migration 
and thus mitigate the buildup of regional inequalities. The importance of building up 
human capital in the lagging regions also turns attention to some important international 
experience. In addition, providing education and health services for rural migrants in 
urban centers is also essential to facilitate more migration.   Over the past two decades, in 
many countries social protection and social investment have converged in the shape of 
Conditional Cash Transfers targeted to building up the human capital of the poorest. This 
is an area in which China does not have much experience in recent history, and it is an 
area in which Chinese policy makers could indeed learn from international experience in 
countries such as Brazil, Mexico and India. The regional dimensions of these programs, 
their targeting to poorer regions, are of particular interest. China can also learn from the 
rich international experience in specific social programs, such as school feeding 
programs. However, because of large differences in context from other countries, China 
must adopt an experimental approach when introducing these programs and redesign as 
lessons are learnt.  
 
Regarding governance reform, there is varied international experience, ranging 
from India’s experiments with village level democracy, or the constitutional powers 
given to the regions in Brazil, etc. However, we would argue that political, locational and 
cultural specificities make such experiences almost unusable for China. Rather, we would 
argue that China should continue to conduct its own experiments in governance reform, 
especially in light of the finding that provincial level decentralization has contributed to 
growing regional inequalities. Improvements in governance at county level and below in 
the lagging regions hold out greater promise. We have suggested a number of policy 
options, such as twinning of advanced and lagging counties to advance learning, and 
changing the contract of cadres in advanced and lagging regions to better reflect social 
objectives in lagging regions. But once again, experimentation should be the mind set as 
these options are introduced. 
 
Pragmatism, trial and error, evidence-based policymaking, and experimentation 
with small scale policy reforms that are later scaled up, are all key features of China’s 
reforms. Most successful reforms in China have experienced pilot experiments and 
impact evaluations before being scaled up.  Learning by experimentation is a key strategy 
when reformers face huge economic and political uncertainty. When facing choices never 
seen before, it is extremely risky for agents to make radical choices. For any reform goal, 
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there are potentially many different paths to take. Due to uncertainty, it is hard to judge 
which option is more feasible from the ex ante point of view. In such circumstances, 
experimentation can be a useful tool to search for more information and for testing and 
updating prior hypotheses. Experiments yield information to help understand what works 
and what does not. In particular, experimentation can help control the possible disastrous 
consequence of wrong choices. A wrong choice, at large scale, may be irreversible, and 
therefore may undermine the credibility and stability of the political leadership, and 
weaken overall learning capacity. 
 
An important point to note here, in the context of emergence of randomized 
microeconomic experiments within development economics (Duflo, 2005), is that most 
of China’s experiments were not random. Specifically, experiments were often initiated 
in isolated poor areas. As shown in Du (2010), the Chinese leaders purposively initiated 
the household responsibility system as a pilot reform in several remote provinces in order 
to avoid minimize the potential costs of failure and reduce the political resistances. 
Although such experiments were not so rigorously conducted as to include control 
groups, the pilots enabled researchers and policy makers to observe what worked and 
what did not on the ground.  
 
Such experimentation has been particularly important in overcoming several 
major obstacles to effective reform in China, related to the country’s size, its diversity, 
and the history and structure of its hierarchical political system. For a large and diverse 
economy like China, it is very difficult to derive a single one-size-fits-all blueprint for 
reform simply by applying textbook economic theories. Instead, trial and error processes 
can help discover local best practice. At the same time, the large regional differences 
imply opportunities for institutional and policy experimentation. The particular reform 
measures can be heterodox and context specific. Most of the reform measures which have 
turned out to so successful in the past several decades originated from within provinces 
and townships and followed the spirit of experimentation before being scaled up.  
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Table 1:  Regional Economic Development 
 
    Per capita GDP or income in 2007 (yuan)   IMR (‰)     Illiteracy rate (%) 
Province  GDP  Urban income  Rural income Urban/Rural Overall Urban  Rural  Rural/Urban Overall Urban  Rural  Rural/Urban 
  Beijing 57431 24725 10662 2.3 0.8 0.0 4.5 n.a. 3.9 3.7 8.7 2.4 
  Tianjin 47972 19423 7911 2.5 2.3 1.7 3.4 2.0 4.8 4.5 8.2 1.8 
  Hebei 19363 13341 4796 2.8 8.4 4.4 10.0 2.3 7.2 4.6 8.7 1.9 
  Shanxi 16143 13119 4097 3.2 11.9 10.7 12.6 1.2 5.6 3.6 7.2 2.0 
  Inner Mongolia 25558 14433 4656 3.1 13.7 8.8 19.3 2.2 11.3 7.0 17.5 2.5 
  Liaoning 24645 14393 5577 2.6 5.0 4.8 5.3 1.1 4.8 3.7 7.1 1.9 
  Jilin 17211 12830 4933 2.6 5.7 7.6 4.4 0.6 5.9 4.3 8.0 1.9 
  Heilongjiang 18463 11581 4856 2.4 4.4 2.6 5.7 2.2 6.2 4.8 8.2 1.7 
  Shanghai 65473 26675 11440 2.3 2.8 3.2 0.0 0.0 5.2 5.8 13.0 2.2 
  Jiangsu 32985 18680 7357 2.5 11.1 12.5 9.3 0.7 10.0 7.4 14.1 1.9 
  Zhejiang 35730 22727 9258 2.5 9.3 5.2 14.6 2.8 12.0 8.5 16.9 2.0 
  Anhui 11180 12990 4203 3.1 18.2 14.2 20.3 1.4 19.2 11.8 24.1 2.0 
  Fujian 23663 17962 6196 2.9 10.5 6.4 14.4 2.2 12.9 8.5 18.3 2.1 
  Jiangxi 12204 12866 4697 2.7 17.8 9.4 22.8 2.4 10.5 5.8 13.5 2.4 
  Shandong 27148 16305 5641 2.9 8.5 7.0 9.8 1.4 12.4 8.8 16.0 1.8 
  Henan 15056 13231 4454 3.0 7.9 3.0 10.0 3.3 9.8 5.9 11.9 2.0 
  Hubei 14733 13153 4656 2.8 9.3 6.5 11.4 1.8 12.1 7.8 16.0 2.1 
  Hunan 13123 13821 4513 3.1 12.9 9.2 14.9 1.6 8.6 4.1 11.3 2.7 
  Guangdong 32142 19733 6400 3.1 11.3 7.2 17.9 2.5 6.0 4.4 9.8 2.2 
  Guangxi 11417 14146 3690 3.8 15.2 7.3 18.8 2.6 8.6 4.4 10.9 2.5 
  Hainan 13361 12608 4390 2.9 11.7 6.3 16.6 2.7 9.8 7.0 13.6 1.9 
  Chongqing 14011 14368 4126 3.5 9.8 12.3 7.9 0.6 11.7 6.5 16.6 2.5 
  Sichuan 11708 12633 4121 3.1 14.4 10.1 16.2 1.6 16.6 7.8 21.0 2.7 
  Guizhou 6742 11759 2797 4.2 52.3 25.4 61.4 2.4 21.4 9.6 26.1 2.7 
  Yunnan 9459 13250 3103 4.3 36.9 22.3 43.3 1.9 20.1 12.4 24.0 1.9 
  Tibet 11567 12482 3176 3.9 68.8 48.8 72.6 1.5 44.8 37.3 47.9 1.3 
  Shaanxi 12843 12858 3137 4.1 16.0 11.8 18.7 1.6 10.3 6.6 13.5 2.1 
  Gansu 9527 10969 2724 4.0 37.6 16.2 45.5 2.8 20.8 9.6 26.0 2.7 
  Qinghai 12809 11640 3061 3.8 43.1 8.5 57.2 6.7 24.1 10.1 33.7 3.4 
  Ningxia 12695 12932 3681 3.5 25.9 21.6 27.8 1.3 18.7 8.9 26.9 3.0 
  Xinjiang 16164 11432 3503 3.3 24.2 11.2 29.3 2.6 8.3 6.1 9.9 1.6 
National average 22698 15781 4761 3.3 15.0 8.8 19.2 2.2 11.0 6.3 15.2 2.4 
Coast 29183 18430 6046 3.0 9.0 6.7 11.5 1.7 8.8 5.7 12.8 2.2 
Inland 13513 12932 4055 3.2 18.8 10.9 22.9 2.1 12.6 6.8 16.4 2.4 
Note: per capita GDP and income in current prices in 2007 are from China Statistical Yearbook (China National Statistical Bureau, 2008). The 
infant mortality rate (IMR) and illiteracy rate in 2005 are obtained from 1% Population Survey (China National Bureau of Statistics, see 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkou/2005/renkou.htm). The coastal and inland averages are calculated by authors.
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Table 2:  China: Economic Indicators, 1952-2008 
 
Year GDP (Billion) Total expenditure (Billion) Tariff rate (%) Trade ratio (%) Decentralization (%) HID (%) 
1952 67.9 17.2 12.8 9.5 25.9 15.3 
1955 91.0 26.3 7.6 12.1 23.5 19.7 
1960 145.7 64.4 9.2 8.8 56.7 52.1 
1965 171.6 46.0 10.3 6.9 38.2 30.4 
1970 225.3 64.9 12.5 5.0 41.1 36.4 
1975 299.7 82.1 10.2 9.7 50.1 40.2 
1980 454.6 122.9 11.2 12.5 45.7 38.5 
1985 901.6 200.4 16.3 22.9 60.3 38.6 
1990 1866.8 308.4 6.2 29.8 67.4 38.3 
1995 6079.4 682.4 2.6 38.7 70.8 33.1 
2000 9921.5 1588.7 4.0 39.6 65.3 n.a. 
2005 18321.7 3393.0 2.0 63.8 74.1 n.a. 
2008 30067.0 6242.7 2.0 65.3 78.6 n.a. 
 
Note: The data are from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2000) and various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook (China National Bureau of Statistics, various issues). GDP and 
total expenditures are in current prices. GOV and HID stand for gross output value and the percentage of gross output value of heavy 
industry in total GOV (a measure of heavy industry development strategy). Since 1999, China has stopped publishing gross output 
value figures. 
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Table 3:  Regional Inequality and Decomposition: 1952-2007 
 
Year Gini Theil Rural-urban Inland-coast 
1952 25.9 12.7 8.3 0.4 
1955 23.5 10.1 6.6 0.2 
1960 32.6 17.9 13.7 0.4 
1965 28.2 14.0 11.1 0.1 
1970 28.4 14.7 11.9 0.1 
1975 29.0 15.9 13.6 0.3 
1980 26.8 13.6 11.6 0.4 
1985 23.3 9.6 7.2 0.6 
1990 27.0 13.0 8.4 0.9 
1995 30.7 16.2 10.4 1.3 
2000 33.3 19.4 11.8 2.1 
2005 35.0 22.0 13.7 3.0 
2007 34.1 19.4 12.0 3.3 
 
Note: The regional inequality measures are the Gini Coefficient and Theil measure (GE index with c=1), calculated by authors based 
on population weighted real per capita consumption at the provincial level in rural and urban areas. The data are from Comprehensive 
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2000) and various issues of the China 
Statistical Yearbook (China National Bureau of Statistics, various issues). Rural-urban and inland-coastal inequalities are defined as 
the between rural-urban and between inland-coastal components of the GE index. 
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Table 4:  Illiteracy Rate and Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) 
 
Year  National   Rural       Urban Rural/ 
Urban 
Inland Coast Inland/ 
Coast 
Female Male Female/ 
Male 
    Total Female Male  Total Female Male               
Illiteracy rate                
1981 31.9 34.8 49.1 21.1  16.4 24.6 8.9 2.1 33.7 29.1 1.2 45.3 19.2 2.4 
1990 22.2 26.2 37.1 15.7  12.0 18.4 6.1 2.2 23.8 19.6 1.2 31.9 13.0 2.5 
2000 15.2 18.7 26.5 11.2  8.7 13.1 4.1 2.2 16.0 13.9 1.2 21.8 8.7 2.5 
2005 11.0 15.2 21.8 8.5  6.3 9.7 2.8 2.4 12.6 8.8 1.4 16.1 5.9 2.8 
IMR                
1981 36.6 39.1 38.1 40.0  23.6 22.4 24.8 1.7 44.5 24.4 1.8 35.7 37.6 1.0 
1990 30.5 32.4 34.9 30.0  19.1 19.5 18.8 1.7 35.8 17.2 2.1 30.6 26.8 1.1 
2000 24.1 30.8 36.7 25.8  11.0 13.5 10.3 2.8 26.8 13.6 2.0 28.4 20.5 1.4 
2005 15.0 19.2 22.2 16.7   8.9 9.1 8.6 2.2 18.8 9.0 2.1 16.9 13.5 1.2 
 
Note: The data in 1981, 1990 and 2000 are from the China Population Census in the corresponding years. The data in 2005 are 
obtained from 1% Population Survey (China National Bureau of Statistics, see http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkou/2005/ 
renkou.htm). The 1981 census defines the illiteracy rate using age 12 as a benchmark, while the 1990 and 2000 censuses and the 2005 
1% population survey refer to the people 15 years old and above. Therefore, they may not be totally comparable.  
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Table 5:  Regional Inequality in Illiteracy Rate and Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) 
 
Year Gini Theil Rural-urban  Inland-coast  Female-male  
Illiteracy rate      
1981 30.3 14.5 17.8 0.2 59.0 
1990 33.5 18.1 26.0 2.4 51.4 
2000 36.3 21.4 25.8 1.1 44.6 
2005 41.8 28.4 29.7 5.0 39.7 
      
IMR      
1981 27.0 11.9 11.1 31.6 0.3 
1990 29.6 14.1 16.7 38.1 1.6 
2000 36.7 22.5 35.9 20.6 5.1 
2005 40.0 28.4 18.5 18.2 2.8 
 
Note: See Table 2 for data sources. The GE measure is parameterized so as to make it the Theil measure of inequality. National 
inequality in illiteracy rate and infant mortality rate (IMR) are calculated using population at the provincial level with a rural-urban 
and gender divide. Rural-urban, inland-coastal, and female-male polarization indexes are defined as the ratio of between-group GE to 
total GE.  
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Table 6:  Progress in Establishing Rural Social Security 
  
  2006 2008 
Extreme poverty line (yuan) 683 785 
Total number of people below the line (million) 23.65 21.48 
   
Total central spending on minimum support (hundred million) 42 94 
No. of people covered (million) 15.09 42.84 
Average amount per capita (yuan) 276 218 
Minimum support transfer as a percentage of poverty line 40 28 
   
CMS enrollment rate (%) 79 92 
Per capita total contribution (yuan) 50 100 
Percentage of government contribution (%) 80 80 
 
Note: Compiled by authors based on official documents posted on the Chinese webpage (http://cn.chinagate.cn/society/2009-
04/22/content_17653543.htm.  
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Figure 1:  Regional Inequality in Per Capita Consumption 
 
Note: The regional inequality measures are the Gini Coefficient and Theil Index (with c=1), calculated by authors based on population 
weighted real per capita consumption at the provincial level in rural and urban areas. The data are from Comprehensive Statistical 
Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2000) and various issues of China Statistical 
Yearbook (China National Bureau of Statistics, various issues).  
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Figure 2:  Heavy Industry Development Strategy and Rural-Urban Divides 
 
Note: The left vertical axis stands for heavy industry development strategy (HID), while the right one represents rural-urban disparity.  
The data are from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China National Bureau of Statistics, 
2000) and various issues of China Statistical Yearbook (China National Bureau of Statistics, various issues).  
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Figure 3:  Openness and Inland-Coastal Disparity 
 
Note: The left vertical axis stands for trade ratio, while the right one represents inland-coastal disparity.  The data are from 
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2000) and various 
issues of China Statistical Yearbook (China National Bureau of Statistics, various issues).  
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Figure 4:  Decentralization and Overall Inequality (Gini coefficient) 
 
Note: The left vertical axis stands for the degree of decentralization, while the right one represents the Gini coefficient.  The data are 
from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (China National Bureau of Statistics, 2000) and various 
issues of China Statistical Yearbook (China National Bureau of Statistics, various issues).  
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